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CHARLES W. WRIGHT
Natural Selection and Moral Sentiment: 
Evolutionary Biology’s Challenge to Moral 
Philosophy
It’s unfortunate that our college curricula don’t do a better job of enabling students to 
see the interconnections among the various disciplines. It’s regrettable that faculty in 
different disciplines find it so hard to talk to each other about the things that interest 
them the most. It’s too bad we have so much trouble overcoming the “over” in “over-
specialization.” 
It was just over 30 years ago that E. O. Wilson had the temerity to suggest that eth-
ics ought one day to become a sub-discipline of biology. This arrangement would, he 
said, foster greater progress than had heretofore been achieved because, in his memo-
rable words, moral philosophers had so far done little more than consult “the emotive 
centers of their own hypothalamic–limbic system” (Wilson 1975, 563). Needless to 
say, philosophers were not particularly impressed by his proposal. But with the benefit 
of 30 years’ hindsight, Wilson’s bold assessment begins to look prescient — wrong in 
the details, to be sure (nobody supposes now that moral emotions might be located in 
the hypothalamus), but right in principle (emotionally structured moral intuitions are 
now thought to play a central role in everyday moral judgment). 
In defense of this claim, I shall first briefly review the evolutionary biological back-
ground to Wilson’s pronouncement and take note of one of the sentimentalist impli-
cations arising from it. Then I’ll review contemporary research by social psychologists 
and neuroscientists that provides empirical warrant for these theoretical implications. 
I’ll conclude by considering briefly what these developments might mean for the fu-
ture of moral philosophy. 
Popular conceptions of Darwinian evolutionary theory have long supposed that 
natural selection only fosters ruthless competition among organisms. But at the same 
time such social Darwinian ideas circulated in the public sphere, biologists had come 
to the conclusion that selection also favors cooperative behavior. Starting with Darwin 
himself, until the mid-20th century, leading scientists explained cooperative behavior 
among animals using models of group selection which proposed that such behavior 
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evolved because of the benefits it conferred on the group, be it the local population or 
the species as a whole. 
Such proposals were thoroughly debunked, however, with the publication of George 
Williams’ Adaptation and Natural Selection in 1966. After Williams’ critique the only 
reputable scientific position was to suppose that the forces of natural selection worked 
on the individual organism (or, on the genetic material that it contained), not on 
groups. But then “altruism” became a problem in need of a solution. Certain kinds of 
cooperative behavior — alarm calls, for instance — no longer made theoretical sense, 
since they impose fitness-reducing costs upon one organism while conferring fitness-
enhancing benefits to others. From a narrow Darwinian perspective — the perspective 
of popular imagination — such behavior ought to disappear from a population. 
The theoretical advances made in response to this problem are by now fairly widely 
known. W. D. Hamilton (1964) proposed the idea of inclusive fitness, whereby one 
organism’s apparently fitness-reducing behavior will ensure the propagation of its ge-
netic material when directed toward sufficiently close relatives. Robert Trivers (1971) 
next hypothesized that under certain conditions — for instance, high frequency of 
interaction , relatively long lifespan, a certain cost-benefit ratio to the acts, and so forth 
— reciprocal exchanges of benefits between unrelated individuals could develop. R. 
D. Alexander’s (1979, 1987) concept of indirect reciprocity extended Trivers’ model 
by including social observation and reputation formation, factors enabling stable net-
works of exchange to develop among relatively small groups of individuals. Among 
these three theoretical approaches, cooperative behavior could be explained among 
close kin, friends and allies, and small face-to-face communities. One philosophically 
interesting feature of these theoretical models is their hypothesis that the regulation 
of these cooperative relations would be supported by emotional, rather than cognitive 
systems. This was the point of Wilson’s offhand remark about philosophers consulting 
their hypothalamic systems. 
Why this hypothesis? Explanations differ, but all point to some selective advantage 
that emotional regulation would have over cognitive regulation of behavior. Trivers 
(1971) suggests that motives embedded in affective systems would better sustain stable 
networks of reciprocity than those produced by rational calculations of advantage. 
Michael Ruse (1986, 1988), an early philosophical convert to the evolutionary per-
spective, appeals to energetic parsimony. Emotional processing systems — automatic, 
unconscious, and carrying strong action dispositions — are, in terms of the time, 
energy, and attention required to influence behavior, both cheaper to support and 
more efficient than cognitive processing systems. And natural selection always favors 
cheap efficiency. Whatever the hypothesized reason, the perspective endorsed by these 
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theorists more or less amounted, in the case of human social conduct, to an endorse-
ment of moral sentimentalism. 
Unsurprisingly, moral philosophers have contested the adequacy of such accounts. 
Patricia Williams (1993) insisted that evolutionary models of the moral sentiments en-
tail an unwarranted constriction on human freedom of choice. Alan Gewirth (1993) 
argued that such models reduce morality to a kind of tribalism and utterly fail to ac-
count for the universal and egalitarian moral principles that inform modern Western 
societies. And Philip Kitcher (1985) claimed that Wilson’s sentimentalist proposal 
committed him to naïve conceptions of emotivism and relativism, against which John 
Rawls’ constructivist account of moral objectivity was much to be preferred. But even 
as philosophical reason debunked evolutionary models of moral sentiments, recent 
empirical research suggests that the biologists cannot be so easily dismissed. 
Space constraints won’t permit me to review this literature in the detail it warrants. 
I can offer you only the broadest of brushstrokes. There is, to start, the widely cit-
ed work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1994) and his colleagues (Anderson, 
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; 
Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996), who found that damage to certain 
emotional centers in the brain severely impede a person’s capacity for moral judgment. 
Similarly, social psychologist R. J. R. Blair (1995, 1997; Blair, Mitchell, Kelly, Richell, 
Leonard, Newman, & Scott, 2002) has found that the behavioral disorders of psy-
chopathic individuals are better explained in terms of emotional deficits rather than 
in terms of shortcomings in their capacity for reason. Neuroscientist Jorg Moll and 
his colleagues (Moll, Eslinger, & de Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, 
Bramati, & Grafman 2002; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger, 2003), who study 
the functional architecture of brains engaged in moral evaluation, also find that moral 
judgments elicit greatest activity in brain regions associated with affect. 
From the perspective of contemporary moral philosophy, though, the most interest-
ing work may have been carried out by Joshua Greene, R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh 
Nystrom, John Darley, and Jonathan Cohen, who asked subjects to deliberate about 
a much discussed moral problem while undergoing fMRI scans of their brain activity. 
In the problem, a runaway trolley will kill five people unless some action is taken. The 
trolley might be switched to another track where only one person would be killed, or 
a large person might be pushed in front of the trolley to bring it to a halt. Greene and 
his coworkers (2001) found that depending on the nature of the proposed action — 
switching versus pushing — different regions of the brain tended to be differentially 
activated. The “personal” dilemma — push a person in front of the trolley — ener-
gized brain areas associated with social emotional processing more highly. By contrast, 
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regions associated with classically cognitive processes such as working memory, ab-
stract reasoning, and problem solving were more highly activated by the “impersonal” 
option of rerouting the trolley away from the five and toward one. 
In a follow-up study, Greene and his colleagues (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, 
& Cohen, 2004) investigated the brain processes of subjects who deliberate about 
and in some cases endorse actions (pushing a person in front of a trolley, smothering 
a baby) that would under ordinary circumstances be judged morally repugnant, but 
because of morally salient circumstances (preventing the deaths of even more people) 
might be judged acceptable. These difficult personal moral dilemmas elicited activ-
ity not only in emotional and cognitive centers, but also in a region — the anterior 
cingulate cortex — recently associated with the mediation of cognitive conflict. By 
contrast, in cases of straightforward personal transgressions that lack countervailing 
moral considerations — for example, a teenage mother who kills an unwanted infant 
— social-emotional centers are significantly more highly energized. 
Greene et al. (2004) interpret their findings in the first instance as evidence for “a 
synthetic view of moral judgment that acknowledges the crucial roles played by both 
emotion and ‘cognition’.” (397) But they also situate this dual-process model in an 
evolutionary perspective. Evidence from the social dynamics of primates (De Waal 
1996), from the archaeological record (Aiello & Dunbar 1993; Dunbar 1996), as 
well as from existing foraging societies (Boehm 1999) all support the hypothesis that 
humankind’s early hominid ancestors lived in tightly knit social networks in which 
behavior was regulated by moral emotions such a guilt, anger, empathy, gratitude, 
and a sense of fairness. On the basis of this evidence they conclude that “it would be 
strange if human behavior were not driven in part by domain-specific social-emotional 
dispositions.” (Greene et al., 2004, 389) By contrast, the “domain general capacity for 
sophisticated abstract reasoning” (390) found to be at work in deliberations about im-
personal and difficult personal moral dilemmas is a relatively more recent evolutionary 
development. The clear implication is that phylogenetically older affective systems 
steer everyday moral conduct while more recently evolved cognitive systems are only 
activated in situations of conflict or heightened social complexity. 
What are the implications of this rapidly growing body of research for the future of 
moral philosophy? The first, I think, is that moral philosophers ignore the evolution-
ary history of the capacity for moral judgment at the risk of disciplinary irrelevance. 
Debates between rationalists and sentimentalists, for instance, are doomed to sterility 
until both sides recognize that evolution has constructed moral judgment out of both 
affective and cognitive components. In certain circumstances judgments will conform 
to the sentimentalist model, while other judgments in other circumstances will con-
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form more closely to the rationalist model. No judgment will ever be devoid of either 
affect or cognition. Philosophical work built on premises contrary to these neuro-
logical facts may advance academic careers but seems unlikely to produce genuine 
insight. 
Similarly, the question whether moral judgments are necessarily or contingently 
motivating is unlikely to reach settlement until philosophers recognize that moral 
judgment is not a unitary phenomenon, but rather arises from the coordinated activ-
ity of a variety of brain sectors (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll et al., 2003). Given this 
neurological structure, both the internalist and the externalist accounts can be correct 
depending on the psychological system giving rise to a judgment. If a judgment is 
produced by automatic, intuitive systems, the internalist account will be closer to the 
truth. If produced by controlled cognitive processes, externalist descriptions will be 
more appropriate. In those cases where a moral judgment involves both automatic and 
controlled systems of cognition, both accounts will be correct. 
A full appreciation of the evolutionary history and multi-layered structure of mor-
al judgment promises dramatically to reshape the philosophical conversation about 
judgment and motivation. The second implication is more general, but follows from 
the preceding observations. It would seem that it is time for philosophers to relinquish 
the conceit that moral philosophy — whether in Kantian, conceptual analytic, or any 
other form — can be an autonomous, a priori undertaking.
Chuck Wright is an Associate Professor of Philosophy.
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